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Abstract—Purchase decisions for devices in high-throughput
networks as well as scientific evaluations of algorithms and tech-
nologies need to be based in measurements and clear procedures.
Therefore, evaluation of network devices and their performance
in high-throughput networks is an important part of research. In
this paper, we document our approach and show its applicability
for our purpose in an evaluation of two of the most well-
known and common open source intrusion detection systems,
Snort and Suricata. We used a hardware network testing setup
to ensure a realistic environment and documented our testing
approach. In our work, we focus on accuracy of the detection
especially dependent on bandwidth. We would like to pass on
our experiences and considerations.
Index Terms—IDS; performance tests; high-speed networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer networks provide a wide range of targets for ma-
licious purpose. An attacker can be able to steal sensitive data
or even bring the system to a standstill. For this reason, there
must be mechanisms to protect networks. Intrusion detection
systems (IDS) are one of the most important components of
a modern security infrastructure. Especially communities and
companies that deal with a large and growing amount of data
have increasing demands on current computer networks. This
is the reason why 10 Gbps Ethernet has become a standard
within company and university networks. In terms of security,
IDS are commonly used to inspect networks and as an essential
component to find different kinds of attacks. As they observe
network traffic, network-based systems are now facing a great
challenge and it must be tested, whether they can handle
it. There is a clear need for an overview of the different
systems and their performance in high-speed network traffic,
so provider get an idea of what solution to choose. Such
an overview is challenging as the term Intrusion Detection
System is used for a wide area of technologies. Therefore
it must be discussed how those different solutions can be
evaluated in a comparative way. As the results are supposed
to be comparable, it must be ensured that all of the solutions
run under exactly the same conditions. This means, they
should get the same resources in terms of hardware and input
data. Based on our previous work in building network testing
frameworks [1][6] and testing networks [5], we evaluate IDS in
high-throughput networks. The paper is organised as follows:
Section II lists comparable works our work is based on,
Section III elaborates on the IDS we chose to evaluate and why
while Section IV documents our approach. In Section V the
most important evaluation results are summarized. Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
There is a lot of work discussing IDS and their ability to
handle high-speed traffic. Most of them focus on improving
the settings of software and systems to the new requirements.
When it comes to performance evaluations in high-speed
networks, there are only a couple of detailed reports available.
Concerning the general evaluation of IDS, Milenkoski et
al. [8] should be mentioned. The authors give a detailed
overview of practices, that are used to evaluate IDS. They
structure the evaluation into three parts: workloads, metrics
and methodology. We use this as a guideline for this project
and help to generate benchmark data. In the last part they
present measurement methodologies, which define the systems
properties of interest as well as the employed workloads and
metrics to evaluate this properties. However, they do not
conduct any tests. The three open-source solutions of Intrusion
Detection Systems — namely Suricata, Bro and Snort — have
been tested extensively. Those tests mostly focus on their
accuracy. Only a few of them evaluate their performance in
high-speed networks. Khalil [4] gives a good overview of the
three open-source solutions. He outlines their problems with
handling high-speed traffic and the solutions those systems
implement. He also outlines a couple of performance tests
that have been run on those systems. They analyzed overall
performance concerning traffic throughput but did not analyze
the precision of the IDS under test. Bula´joul et al. [2] ran
a couple of tests to evaluate Snorts performance. For their
analysis they altered three different values: the number of
packets per second, number of packets sent over all and
the packet length. As performance indicators they use the
number of packets received, analyzed, dropped, and filtered.
The number of packets filtered does not occur in the figures,
only the number of packets sent. According to the authors this
value is not altered during the experiment, only the speed at
which those packets have been sent. There is a figure included
where the number of packets sent decreases when the speed
increases. This is contrary to the point that the number of
packets sent is not altered. Furthermore, this value should be
redundant to the number of packets received as Snort should
receive the packets sent, however, the data indicates otherwise.
Nevertheless, their experiments show that the number of
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packets dropped increases, when they increase the speed. This
could give a basic indicator of Snorts performance in high-
speed traffic. Most IDS answer the challenge to handle high-
speed networks with some kind of load-balancing. Vallentin et
al. [12] present a cluster solution for network-based intrusion
detection. They introduce Cluster Bro, which is a solution to
handle high-speed traffic with Bro. The input is split across
several ’worker’ nodes, that analyze their part of the traffic and
a management system is used to perform the overall analysis.
Their work also includes a performance evaluation to show
that the cluster produces sound results even at high throughput.
They also mention that their solution ran at IEEE Supercom-
puting 2006, where it ’monitored the conferences primary 1
Gbps backbone network as well as portions of the 100 Gbps
High Speed Bandwidth Challenge network which is a very
broad term and could mean anything between 0 and 100 Gbps.
The basic points are that the cluster gives the same results
as a single Intrusion Detection System. In their performance
evaluation they focus on the ability to balance the incoming
traffic to the different nodes — namely the scalability — and
the overhead of communication this cluster solution introduces
in comparison to a single IDS. There is no evaluation of the
Cluster’s accuracy as part of this paper.
III. SYSTEMS UNDER REVIEW
There are three relevant open-source IDS that can be found
in related work — Bro, Suricata, and Snort. We limit our
analysis to Snort and Suricata as Bro is an anomaly-based
IDS that functions differently to the other two in many ways.
Snort1 is an open-source network-based Intrusion Detection
System. Its functionalities include packet capturing, analysis of
captured packets and — important for this work — live analysis
of network traffic. The version tested in this paper is 2.9.9. A
lot of dependencies have to be installed before Snort is able
to run properly. Those include libnet — a network API to gain
access to different protocols, libpcap — a library to capture
network traffic and pcre — a collection of functions with Perl
semantic and syntax. New to version 2.9 is the usage of the
DAQ library, which replaces libpcap calls to simplify packet-
I/O-options.
Snort provides the possibility for developers and users to
add own modules called preprocessors. One of them is Perf-
mon [10]. Using this preprocessor the user gets informed about
statistics such as received and dropped packets during runtime.
To use the preprocessor a corresponding option has to be set
during the build process.
After Snort has been installed successfully, it needs to be
configured. This is done using the configuration file written in
a specific Snort format. For this work, configuration meant to
set network variables, choose active rules, activate the Perfmon
preprocessor, and set output formats. There are three different
sets of rules: subscriber, registered, and community rules. The
basic set of rules is taken from the subscriber snapshot and is
extended by rules to detect included attacks.
1snort.org
Another open-source network-based Intrusion Detection
System is Suricata2. Its version 3.2.1 is the basis for testing.
Besides the same dependencies as Snort, it needs libraries to
process files in yaml format. This is used to read and write the
configuration file. Different from Snort is the multi-threading
option. This is included in all Suricata versions and needs to
be configured correctly. Its performance is depending on the
number of processors and some memory caps that have to be
set properly with regards to the chosen number of processors.
Fine tuning of Suricata is done according to [9]. During a first
experiment, it became obvious that the number of processors
influences the performance, and with more processors memory
consumption grows extremely.
Suricata is able to parse and use Snort rules. In addition,
there is a set of rules called emerging rules [11], which has
been used as a basis. During live analysis, Suricata produces
alert logs in the same format as Snort. Furthermore, Suricata
outputs statistics on the current values of received and dropped
packets.
IV. EVALUATION SETUP
Two networks have to be simulated: an external network and
a home network with the IDS in the middle. Two server are
used to simulate the networks. One of them to send malicious
and benign packets and the other to receive them. Both are
connected via 10 GB interfaces to the IDS server. The server
has to have sufficient resources to be capable of analyzing
the traffic at line speed. We chose an off-the-shelf server with
4 CPU cores with 3.1 GHz3 and 6 GB of memory; multi-
threaded intrusion detection systems can make use of 4 threads
per processing step.
A. Traffic Simulation
Malicious traffic is simulated and captured before the actual
evaluation so repeatability of the tests is ensured. The attacking
VM is running Kali Linux, whereas the target machines run
Ubuntu Server, one with Metasploit. Wireshark is used to
capture traffic. Target IP addresses are set to the receivers
incoming interface. The attacking IP address is changed in
a manner that each attack has its own sending IP address.
This is done to distinguish logged alerts. As the response of
the receiving server is not analyzed by the IDS under test,
they are removed from the captured traces. Figure 1 shows
the complete process of generating attack captures.
We used the threat report by McAfee Labs[7] to determine
a typical attack mix that realistically represents the day to
day threats of networks connected to the Internet. According
to the report, browser-based attacks are the most prevalent,
followed by brute force login attempts (e.g. SSH brute force),
followed by denial of service attacks, SSL attacks, scans (e.g.
nmap scans), DNS spoofing, and backdoors. All in all, these
attacks account for 91% of all network attacks. We generated
these attacks with different tools. The whole list can be seen
in Table I. The benign traffic is simulated with iperf34, as it is
2suricata-ids.org
3IntelXeon Processor E3-1220 v3
Fig. 1. Generating malicious traffic captures.
capable of generating 10 Gbps traffic at runtime mixed with
data peaks. To simulate a data center it is necessary to include
data peaks. Large datasets are publicly available at different
sources (KDnuggets [3] as an example). Those captures can
later be resent several times per evaluation run. A problem
is to gain appropriate traffic speed with tcpreplay, this could
only be achieved when storing the data set in a RAM-disk.
B. Rule Selection
Appropriate rules for the IDS must be chosen to ensure
that they are able to detect all attacks included in the attack
traffic — given that the IDS has the time to analyze the traffic.
Furthermore, the traffic has to be labeled to later decide if a
detection is a false or true positive. The rule sets for the IDS
under test follow different syntax but have to be semantically
identical to ensure that speed differences between the IDS
only depend on the IDS implementation. For the performance
evaluation a minimum set of rules has been chosen as the
purpose is to measure the capability to handle high-speed
traffic not the influence of the number of rules. Thresholds for
detection and similar parameters are chosen identical for both
systems (e.g. 150 as the threshold for flooding attack alerts).
4iperf.org
Attack type Tool used
successful SSH brute force Metasploit framework
unsuccessful SSH brute force Metasploit framework
TCP connect flood nping
TCP SYN flood hping3
UDP flood hping3
SYN scan nmap -sS
SYN OS-scan nmap -sS -O
UDP scan nmap -sU
User enumeration nmap
TABLE I
INCLUDED ATTACK TYPES.
The number of active rules influences the overall performance.
Therefore, this number is the same for both IDS.
C. Evaluation Process
A single test needs four parameters: the time for the
evaluation, the number of attacks per minute, the traffic speed,
and the chosen IDS. During one test, three phases can be
distinguished: initialization, evaluation, and output. During the
first step the IDS is initialized and the attack plans for the setup
are read from configuration files. Those files contain a list of
attacks that should be send at minute m during an evaluation of
M minutes. This ensures that each IDS is tested with the same
attacks and that there are no variations within a test run. During
the test run, traffic, CPU, and memory usage is monitored.
Benign traffic is sent continuously at the given speed and the
defined attacks per minute using tcpreplay. In this setup, more
attacks also results in a slightly higher number of packets per
minute. Table II shows the steps on each server during a single
test. The output of a certain throughput and different amount of
attacks is one test sample (e.g. 5,10,15,20 attacks at 2 Gbps).
A test phase includes all test samples for a chosen IDS. This
means tests are performed for throughputs and attack amounts
in given ranges. A sample test and a complete test phase are
both completely automated. The processes on all three servers
must be started at the same time, synchronized clocks on all
servers are required.
D. Result Processing
Each test has several outputs in different formats. The result
processing for a single test — meaning exactly one value for
speed and one for attacks per minute — are discussed first.
Timestamps must be compared to ensure that all outputs are
within the same time period. Most traffic speed log files
differ in their units. They are recomputed to Gb and the
different bandwidth files are combined to one. This can be
used to check the resulting traffic throughput during evaluation
Program part IDS Sender Receiver
Start start IDS read in attacks
wait for IDS
Monitoring CPU, memory, traffic outgoing traffic incoming traffic
Evaluation part wait send packets wait
Output modify output files
End kill IDS instance
Resting phase
TABLE II
PER SERVER TASKS DURING THE EVALUATION PROGRAM.
and find bottlenecks if those exists. As mentioned earlier, all
included IDS output information about their current received
and dropped packets. Those values are extracted and com-
bined with the measured CPU and memory usage. The CPU
documentation gives the amount of CPU usage per core. Due
to some rule settings, it is possible that a reference log file
includes messages that are not necessary to identify an attack.
This especially occurred when detecting SSH brute force
attacks with Suricata. During the reference phase, logs contain
messages such as ’ET INFO NetSSH SSH Version String
Hardcoded in Metasploit’. Those are legitimate messages but
not necessary to identify the actually attack — however, the
message ’ET SCAN Potential SSH Scan’ is. To keep track
of messages that can appear but do not have to, priority files
have been introduced. They include the attack message and
a priority — 0 means the message must be there and 1 it is
acceptable if it is missing. The value is only added to false
positives if the message itself really was not expected in this
minute. Some messages are redundant. As an example Snort
either logs a ’TCPFilteredScan’ or ’TCPScan’ message when
detecting a SYN scan. Those messages are mapped so they
end up as correctly logged alerts. The result of the process
is a file containing a mapping of minute, message to logged-
and expected counters as well as a statistic counted per type of
attack. The first file can be used to identify the (mis-)matches
per minute during one test. Furthermore, those values are
used to identify the detection performance. Once all tests of a
test sample have been processed, sample wide values can be
counted. This means per minute attack detection statistics are
summed up and used to compute performance measurements.
One of them is true positive rate or sensitivity which represents
the detected attacks out of all attacks. Another value of interest
is precision giving the percentage of correctly identified alerts
among all logged alerts. CPU and memory consumption are
averaged over all measured values. Packet information is taken
from the IDS performance output and from system log files.
Suricata outputs totals of the current values, Snort averages
over runtime, therefore values are computed into averages
over runtime for all packet information files. The same has
to be done for alerts per second values and the drop rate.
The number of packets that have not been considered can be
computed from the number of packets that have been send and
the number of packets that have been analyzed by the IDS. All
output values for a test sample are summarized in Table III.
Snort Suricata
Fig. 2. CPU utilization per CPU core in use and packet drop rate of Snort
and Suricata dependent on bandwidth.
Snort Suricata
Fig. 3. Precision and sensitivity dependent on the amount of attacks per
minute.
V. RESULTS
The evaluation part included tests for 30 minutes each
with equal attack distributions. Meaning all types of attacks
mentioned previously are included with the same probability.
Traffic speeds from 1 to 7 Gbps have been included as well
as attacks from 10 to 35 per minute. The data implicates,
that throughput has great influence on the CPU utilization
and drop rate while the amount of attacks does not influence
these factors. Precision and sensitivity on the other hand where
not influenced by the throughput (despite the high drop rate
Value Meaning Arithmetic
True Positive TP Correct logged messages sample sum
False Positive FP Logged but not expected sample sum
False Negative FN Expected but not logged sample sum
True Positive Rate Attack detection rate (Sensitivity) TP/(TP + FN)
False alarm rate Rate of false alarms FP/(TP + FP)
Precision Rate of correct alerts among all alerts TP/(TP + FP)
CPU CPU usage of IDS sample average
Memory Memory usage of IDS sample average
Received packets RP Packets analyzed by IDS average over time
Droprate DP Packets dropped by the IDS average over time
Send packets SP Actual send packets average over time
TABLE III
RESULT VALUES PER TEST SAMPLE.
differences) but only by the amount of attacks in the network.
Neither bandwidth nor amount of attackers had influence on
memory usage (Snort: 6MB, Suricata: 80MB). There were no
false positives observed in any test scenario.
Figure 2 shows the CPU and packet drop measurements.
Every data point contains measurements with different amount
of attackers (10, 15, 20, 25, 30, and 35 attackers per minute).
While Snort’s drop rate is low throughout all measurements,
the CPU utilization rises linearly and reaches up to 65% with
7 Gbps of traffic. Suricata’s approach is different. The CPU
utilization per CPU core stays quite constant other than the
measurement with only 1 Gbps of traffic as less CPU cores are
in use here. However, Suricata begins to drop packets as soon
as the throughput is higher than 1 Gbps. Suricata consistently
analyses 1 Gbps and drops any traffic exceeding that limit.
Figure 3 shows the precision and sensitivity measure-
ments. Every data point contains measurements with differ-
ent throughputs of attack traffic (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7
Gbps). Although Suricata heavily drops packets depending
on throughput, and Snort does not, higher throughput did not
influence the precision or sensitivity. However, more attacks
in the test traffic did lead to worse detection rates. All in all,
Suricata showed better performance.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we described a possible way to handle perfor-
mance evaluation tasks and used this process to evaluate two
software-based IDS and stress tested their performance. We
used a hardware-based network setup with commodity hard-
ware, tested with different throughput and different amounts
of attacks per minute to evaluate which parameters influence
performance the most and what administrators have to keep in
mind when choosing and setting up an IDS in their network.
We showed that bandwidth only plays a minor role for the
precision of the systems under review, while the amount of
expected attack traffic should be considered. Furthermore, the
systems under review tend to heavily rely on good CPU
performance while their memory requirements are comparably
low.
For the future, we will extend our evaluation to other IDS
(e.g. Bro) and to test beyond 10 Gbps on stronger hardware to
evaluate whether software IDS can be applicable in backbone
networks. We plan to update the data set regularly based on the
threat reports and — together with the configuration files for
the IDS — publish this data. Furthermore, we plan to extend
the evaluation work to include other security devices such as
firewalls.
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